[Your Name] [Your Address] [Your City/State/Zip] [Your Phone] [Date] The Honorable [Name] [Title] [address] [City/state/zip] Dear Senator/Representative [Last Name]: I applaud your efforts, and those of fellow members of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, to close the security gaps that exist in our airports and government facilities. You have my 100% support for any efforts to pursue advanced technologies, including imaging analysis software, to improve safety for the American public. Clearly our sole reliance on scanning hardware isn’t working. As a traveler, I’m subjected to multiple, time-consuming and annoying security procedures that give the appearance of security, but leave me asking, “Am I really safe?” The Christmas day bombing attempt and the 2009 GAO report undeniably indicate that our vulnerability remains unchanged since 9/11, despite substantial government spending on security scanner R&D and equipment. As your constituent, I entrust my family’s safety to you. Please look beyond the marketing hype of the scanner manufacturers and examine some basic facts that demonstrate that we cannot continue to rely on the current system of scanner hardware and human screeners and expect different results. • Software provided by the scanner manufacturers produces extremely large volumes of “false positives,” so TSA deactivates it on scanners. • X-ray baggage scanners and whole-body imagers rely solely on the human screener to detect weapons and explosives. • Explosives can be molded to any shape, to look like other non-threat items, or remain shapeless. In either scenario, the physiology of the human eye prevents the human from being able to reliably determine “threat” or “no threat.” • Contrary to claims made by the manufacturers about the detection capabilities of the whole-body imagers, the scanners would not have detected and visualized the ‘underwear explosive’ due to the low-density nature of the explosive. If the scanners see through clothes, another low-density material, how would they detect the explosive when they don’t differentiate between low-density materials? • Scanners can’t accurately distinguish between benign and explosive liquids. The TSA’s 3-1-1 rule on liquids doesn’t prevent a terrorist from packing multiple 3-oz. bottles of liquid explosive, nor combining their liquids with other terrorists’ after security screening. Machine recognition software added to the scanners is the only consistent, accurate method for identifying and detecting threat items in scanned images; compensating for scanner limitations, the limitations of human vision, and potential operator inexperience, inattention, or visual fatigue. Certainly, without a comprehensive security program that includes automated threat identification software, terrorists will breach security again. That thought haunts me every time I or my loved ones fly. Senator/Representative, I became a shareholder in Guardian Technologies because I am thoroughly convinced that PinPoint™ Threat Identification and Detection Software is the sensible solution to the checkpoint security gap that exists at our airports and government facilities. Here is a link to more information: http://www.guardiantechintl.com/security.php As a taxpayer, I’m excited that this software technology doesn’t require a huge investment in hardware or extensive re-training of TSA screeners. PinPoint™ software complements existing and next-generation scanner hardware and has been vetted by the TSA, independent security consultants, and other international government agencies to accurately detect and identify weapons and explosives, with fewer false positives. Many other industries use third-party image analysis software in combination with scanners to successfully perform challenging visual assessments similar to threat identification and detection. It is unfathomable that security scanner manufacturers do not allow third-party image analysis software to be integrated with their scanners, and that no government body compels them to do so. Why should scanner manufacturers open their systems to a software solution when it might jeopardize future hardware sales? I’m hoping your Homeland Security Committee examines the fundamental flaw that continues to hamper checkpoint security effectiveness, and looks at innovative non-hardware solutions that will accurately identify and detect explosives, to move from a perception of public safety to realizable public safety. I have attached, as additional information, a summary of checkpoint security issues for your consideration. For your convenience, I’ve enclosed contact information for Guardian Technologies below. I know they would welcome the opportunity to discuss this in greater depth. Please let me know if I can be of assistance. Sincerely, [Your Name] Contact information for Guardian Technologies: Michael W. Trudnak, CEO Guardian Technologies International, Inc. 516 Herndon Parkway Herndon, VA 20170 (703) 464-5495 Michael.Trudnak@guardiantechintl.com www.guardiantechintl.com